



NATO ATTACKS RUSSIA

Two Case Studies: 20/11/2024 and 22/09/2023

[17-page PDF document, 33.7MB]

A VERY EXTRAORDINARY OPERATION



On the 19th/20th 1942 the Soviet Union launched the Stalingrad Counter-offensive to drive German forces out of Russia.

Exactly 82 years later (precisely, on that very same, auspicious date) top Russian Government leaders met in the Russian village of Marino (Kursk Oblast) to oversee the launch of a counter-offensive intended to drive Ukrainian forces out of Russia. NATO believed that those attending that top-level meeting would have included Russian President Vladimir PUTIN.


In the early afternoon of the 20th November 2024 no less than 12 UK Storm Shadow ALCMs were launched against a single target within the village of Marino – the intended target being the so called (by informed Western media) "Putin's Bunker."

MARINO, KURSK - A MILITARY VILLAGE



The small village of Marino (Kursk Oblast, Russia) appears to be very militarily orientated. Analysis indicates a large COMMAND and CONTROL BUNKER COMPLEX to the north-west of the village, and a RADIO COMMS and INTERCEPTION COMPLEX to the south. The Sanatorium appears to have no direct military role other than (very possibly, and on occasion) to provide accommodation / conference facilities in support of military operations, for very senior political and military visitors to the Kursk region.

THE TARGET – THE MERINO LUXURY SPA HOTEL “BUNKER”, KURSK OBLAST




On the basis of social media content, it appears that all of the grounds and the interior of the Sanatorium Marino (the house, formal gardens, the estate, and the outbuildings) are fully open to members of the public. The exceptions would presumably be whenever the Sanatorium (or parts thereof) are being used for special occasions (i.e. conferences, conventions, etc.)




Memorialising World War 2:

The Sanatorium Marino building is a luxury spa Hotel. It is, in part, dedicated as a memorial to the Russian dead (military and civilian) of World War 2 – in particular the role of people within the Kursk Oblast, following the November 1942 Stalingrad counter-offensive. Note that the [blue](#) box designates the front-line location of the village of Marino.

Ivan SAFRONOV in MARINO, KURSK, December 2015 / January 2016

Ivan SAFRONOV is seen to have visited Marino on at least 2 occasions - on at least 2 locations on the outskirts of Marino, in December 2015; and on at least 2 locations within the village, in January 2016. This was, therefore, some 6 years before the Russian SMO in Ukraine.



During the December 2015 visit, Ivan SAFRONOV photographed what appears to be his travelling companions (and their/his car) - albeit in such a way that their identification is impossible.



The footprints in the snow appear to show Ivan SAFRONOV having walked up to the rear gate of the Russian COMMAND and CONTROL BUNKER COMPLEX, on the north western side of the village of Marino.



On that same visit, Ivan SAFRONOV also walked to (and photographed) the side/rear of the RADIO COMMS/INTERCEPTION COMPLEX.

MARINO, 20th November 2024


This is a still from the drone video, showing the impacts of the UK STORM SHADOW ALCMs within the Russian village of Marino, on the 20th November 2024. Also indicated is the target designation 'box' - together with the relative positions of the Sanatorium, the COMMAND and CONTROL BUNKER COMPLEX, and the RADIO SIGNALS COMMS and INTERCEPT COMPLEX. Notably, the target designation 'box' is initially positioned on the Sanatorium. However, the Storm Shadow impacts occur some 360 meters to the east of that building. The drone operatives quickly remove the target designation 'box', then re-invoke it, and reposition it to align it to the position of the actual Storm Shadow impacts.

THE TARGETING, and ACTUAL IMPACTS




The designated target point was (initially) some 360 meters west of the actual STORM SHADOW impact points.

A 'SPOOFED' ATTACK





Analysis points firmly to the use of 'meaconing' type of GNSS (GPS) equipment, by Russian defence forces, to spoof the STORM SHADOW ACLMs away (and most specifically) from the MERINO SANATORIUM building. The 'miss distance' was a consistent 360 meters, due east (with the exception of 1 'errant' ACLM). This is on the basis of Russia's military perceptions of likely threats against these demonstrably-based military facilities (such as in Marino) - and the actual, observed capabilities of the Russian defence response (as per the off-target impacts of the UK STORM SHADOW ACLMs) - it is possible to determine the basic means (equipment/technology, operational deployment/use) by which the 20th November 2024 attacks upon Merino were thwarted.




CONTEXT: SEVASTOPOL, 22nd SEPTEMBER 2023

The NATO orchestrated attack on the RUSSIAN NAVAL HEADQUARTERS, Sevastopol, Crimea, on the 22nd September 2023 was intended to 'eliminate' the commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Viktor SOKOLOV. Notably, despite this person being a top-rank military commander (reporting directly to the Russian Defence Minister, under Vladimir PUTIN), only 2 STORM SHADOW ACLMs were seen as being warranted for this very important operation. In contrast to this, the target for the Marino "bunker" attack of the 20th November 2024 was seen as warranting the use of no less than 12 STORM SHADOW ACLMs.

RUSSIAN RESPONSE - DNIPRO (ORESHNIK) ATTACK, 21ST NOVEMBER 2024

The KREMLIN / President Vladimir PUTIN were obviously outraged by the STORM SHADOW attack on Russian territory (Marino, Kursk Oblast). The response, just one day later, was the ORESHENKO ballistic missile strike against a Ukrainian missile design, defence and manufacture facility, within the city of Dnipro.

THE OFFICIAL RUSSIAN ACCOUNT OF THE 20th NOVEMBER 2024 STORM SHADOW ATTACK

I wish to underscore once again that the use by the enemy of such weapons cannot affect the course of combat operations in the special military operation zone. Our forces are making successful advances along the entire line of contact, and all objectives we have set will be accomplished.

In response to the deployment of American and British long-range weapons, on November 21, the Russian Armed Forces delivered a combined strike on a facility within Ukraine's defence industrial complex. In field conditions, we also carried out tests of one of Russia's latest medium-range missile systems – in this case, carrying a non-nuclear hypersonic ballistic missile that our engineers named Oreshnik. The tests were successful, achieving the intended objective of the launch. In the city of Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine, one of the largest and most famous industrial complexes from the Soviet Union era, which continues to produce missiles and other armaments, was hit.

Notably, in his (video) response to the Kursk STORM SHADOW attack, President Vladimir PUTIN specifically refers to the attack being targeted against "one of the command posts of our group North" – but that military staff were not affected, and that none the command posts were put out of operation. The reference to "perimeter security staff units and servicing staff" would, however, be consistent with casualties to security staff and civilians in the vicinity of the Sanatorium spa hotel.

This is also evidence of ground-to-air interceptor missiles being used (one of the STORM SHADOWS appear to have been significantly off-course, and could have caused peripheral damage/casualties to security personnel and civilians –it is seen to have impacted close to the swimming pool complex in the immediate proximity to, and connected by covered, 'walkways', to the eastern wing of the Sanatorium).

ATTACK CHARACTERISTICS


The 20/11/2024 attempt at a 'decapitation strike' in Russia (upon "Putin's Bunker") - using 12 UK Storm Shadow ALCMs - has particular characteristics that, upon inspection, may give indications of the planning and operational details of that particular mission.

What has been discovered (re. following detailed analysis) gives reasons to be greatly concerned. Indeed, some of the conclusions to be drawn, from this research, leads to what can only be described as rather terrifying.

The terminal trajectory to target is measured to be 33° east of true north. On the expectation that a maximum stand-off distance would have been mandated, and - given the operational ranges of the launch aircraft and that of the Storm Shadow ALCMs - this would have put the mission start point to be in the vicinity of eastern Romania, close to the Black Sea.

The salvo of 12 Storm Shadow ALCMs would almost certainly have been tracked by Russian AEW aircraft for at least the last 400Km (25 minutes) of their flight over Ukrainian territory. And Russian defence forces (ground-based air defence radars and ground observers) would almost certainly have tracked the Storm Shadow ALCMs for the last 45Km (3 minutes) of their flight time over Russian territorial airspace.

Obviously, UK/NATO will have known that Russia would easily be able to easily to detect and track the Storm Shadow flight paths, over these distances.



REGIONAL CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS (ROMANIA)


A total of 12 Storm Shadow ALCMs appear to have used in the attack, and would therefore have been carried by 6 aircraft.

Notably, there are at least 3 military airbases in the part of Romania from which such a mission could have been launched (re. runway length, provision of aircraft shelters/hangers, good access, and relatively remote from major population centres).

These Romanian airbases are:

- (1) The Mihail Kogalniceanu Airbase (main US/NATO airbase)
- (2) The Fetesti-Gara Airbase
- (3) The Baza Aeriana Boboc Airbase


This is not to say (of course) that the ALCMs could have been launched from some other locality, and programmed to steer onto that flight-path/heading. However, given that all the missiles impacted the target area within (only) approximately 2 minutes, this would have been extremely difficult to 'choreograph' (6 aircraft, 12 ALCMs).



UK GOVERNMENT / RAF STATEMENTS ON TYPHOON IX (BOMBER) SQUADRON DEPLOYMENT TO ROMANIA

From: [Ministry of Defence](#) and [The Rt Hon Grant Shapps](#)
Published 9 April 2024

This was published under the 2022 to 2024 Sunak Conservative government



Royal Air Force pilots will remain in Romania for four months during the mission

Royal Air Force fighter jets have started protecting NATO's eastern flank, close to the Black Sea, following a handover ceremony today in Romania.

Six RAF Typhoon fighter aircraft are taking part in the four-month mission, with jets from IX (Bomber) Squadron, along with more than two hundred RAF personnel from 140 Expeditionary Air Wing (140EAW) deployed from RAF Lossiemouth to Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base in Romania. They will fly alongside the Romanian Air Force as part of NATO's enhanced Air Policing mission (eAP) until August.

22:28 Mon 9 Jun

raf.mod.uk

ROYAL AIR FORCE

Cadets

← All squadrons

IX (BOMBER) SQUADRON

THE SQUADRON


IX Bomber Squadron is stationed at RAF Lossiemouth, Moray, Scotland. IX(B) Squadron now provides specialist adversary, or aggressor training to frontline units. Aircraft flown have included the Vickers Vimy, Avro Lancaster and Vulcan, English Electric Canberra and Panavia Tornado. IX(B) Squadron was the first RAF unit to conduct air strikes over Libya during Operation Ellamy in 2011.

In early 2024 the UK Government issued this press release. WHY?

Why the specificity in regard to the aircraft (6 RAF Typhoons, drawn from the IX Bomber Squadron), and the precise overseas deployment location (Mihail Kogalniceanu Airbase, Romania)? And why, given that that deployment was in very close proximity to the very unstable and very violent conflict between Ukraine and Russia? However, the ability of each of these Typhoon aircraft to carry 2 Storm Shadow missiles (for a total deployment of 12) was studiously (and very noticeably) not mentioned. Why not?

At this time (April 2024) this UK Government announcement made very little sense. It is only with hindsight – the Storm Shadow (12 missiles) attack upon “*Putin’s Bunker*” in the village of Marino, Kursk Oblast, Russia, 7 months later – that analysis might provide a rational explanation. That explanation is this: the UK Government anticipated that Russian Military Intelligence would have seen this press release (obviously) and that – given the particulars of (some) later Storm Shadow attacks – would conclude that the UK carried out that operation. The UK Government’s intention being to provoke Russia into attacking the UK.

THE VERY CLOSE POLITICAL / MILITARY ALLIANCE OF UKRAINE / ROMANIA



In Washington, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President of Romania Klaus Iohannis signed an [Agreement on Security Cooperation between Ukraine and Romania](#).

Romania will transfer a Patriot system to Ukraine, continue to support our country with the same dynamic as in 2022-2024, and facilitate the swift transit of all necessary equipment through its territory to Ukraine.


A key feature of this agreement is specific points of cooperation to strengthen security in the Black Sea region. Romania will assist Ukraine in demining the Black Sea and provide support through EU and NATO tools.

Official Bucharest, along with its partners, will also support the F-16 training center for preparing Ukrainian pilots, thus contributing to the Air Force Capability Coalition. Romania will support our country's defense industry.

Separate sections of the document cover intelligence and counterintelligence, cybersecurity, information security, humanitarian demining, sanctions, and the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine.

Additionally, the agreement includes a 24-hour emergency response mechanism in case of renewed Russian aggression against our country or significant escalation.

Ukraine and Romania signed the security agreement in line with the G7 Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine dated July 12, 2023. Overall, our country has already signed 23 bilateral security agreements: with the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Denmark, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, Latvia, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Iceland, Norway, Japan, the USA, the EU, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Luxembourg, and Romania.



Ukraine Government and RFE/RL statements re. Ukraine/Romania military collaboration.

SEVASTOPOL 22nd SEPTEMBER 2023, in CONTEXT [1]

darklake @darklake99


In 2023 the UK attempted to trick Russia into launching a military strike against the UK sovereign base at Akrotiri, Cyprus – that the UK would then have (falsely) presented to the World as being an entirely unprovoked act of war against the UK, by Russia.

darklake @darklake99 · Jan 13, 2024

On the 22nd September 2023 the Russian Navy HQ in Sevastopol was hit by a precisely-targeted, salvo firing of 2 Storm Shadow missiles, from an RAF Typhoon operating out of RAF Akrotiri (Cyprus). This assessment is based upon detailed analysis (as summarised within this thread).



6:05 AM · Jan 31, 2024 · 357 Views



darklake @darklake99

The 'leaking' of the Typhoon + Storm Shadow training missions, out of Cyprus, was done to raise extreme alarm in Moscow – whilst the extraordinary prominence given by UK / Ukraine to the purported 'Su-24 + Storm Shadow' project was to 'debunk' claims likely to be made by Russia.

6:05 AM · Jan 31, 2024 · 77 Views

It was the peculiar circumstances surrounding the 22nd September 2023 Storm Shadow attack upon the Russian Navy HQ (Black Sea Fleet) in Sevastopol, Crimea, that first alerted me to the possibility of a warmongering strategy being planned and perpetrated by the UK State:

March 6, 2024 : <https://x.com/darklake99/status/1765381202519654895>


January 31st 2024: <https://x.com/darklake99/status/1752573883473956908>

January 31, 2024: <https://x.com/darklake99/status/1752573885139062882>

January 13, 2024: <https://x.com/darklake99/status/1746063376642396292>

That UK strategy would have been (therefore, presumably, and not least) intended to provoke Russia into launching attacks against the UK military assets, such as the base at the RAF Airbase at Akrotiri in Cyprus (housing Typhoon aircraft, equipped with Storm Shadow ALCMs). The UK Government would undoubtedly present this as an 'unprovoked' act of war by Russia against the UK, and would escalate accordingly.


Therefore, (and as with the later attack upon Marino, Kursk Oblast, 14 months later) whilst steering Russia toward concluding that the Storm Shadow attack against Sevastopol was, in fact, carried out by UK RAF Typhoon aircraft, flown by RAF pilots, the UK State (and the US/NATO) would, simultaneously, feed 'evidence' to the general public that the attack was carried out by Ukrainian Pilots, flying Cold War era Su-24 aircraft as the launch platform – and therefore that it was Russia that was spreading propaganda, and was deliberately escalating the conflict.

SEVASTOPOL 22nd SEPTEMBER 2023, in CONTEXT [2]

On the 23rd September 2023 – one day after the Storm Shadow attack upon the Russian Naval HQ, Sevastopol – a US Navy Lockheed EP-3E Aries surveillance aircraft was seen diligently patrolling the coastal area of Romania. Why?

It would appear that, following the Sevastopol attack, US/NATO top-brass fully expected that Russia would have gathered threat intel (ELINT, SIGINT, radar) pointing to the launch-point of that attack being in (or immediately adjacent to) Romanian territory or airspace. Obviously, the US/NATO expectation would have been that Russia would retaliate using its naval assets (Black Sea Fleet surface and subsurface vessels, armed with land-attack ballistic and cruise missiles) upon targets within Romania (i.e. NATO/Romanian airbases).

Indeed (and therefore) this leads to the conclusion that US/NATO had, a-priori, 'engineered' the 22nd September 2023 Storm Shadow attack upon Sevastopol with the specific intention of tricking Russia into launching a retaliatory attack upon Romania. Given that Romania was (and is) a long-time NATO member (since 2004), this would have escalated the Russia/Ukraine conflict into a Europe-wide war. However – and most fortunately – Russia made no such response.



END